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Abstract
By nature, transmissible human knowledge is enumerable: every sen-
tence, movie, audio record can be encoded in a sufficiently long string of
0’s and 1’s. The works of Go¨del, Turing and others showed that there
are inherent limits and properties associated with the fact that language
technology is enumerable. Go¨del’s numbering technique is universal for
enumerable structures and shows strong limits of the language technology.
Computability theory is a particular example: programs can be numbered
and all sorts of limits can be studied from there. Computability is also
at the heart of science since any experimental validation of a theory sup-
poses that theoretical results have been computed, then checked against
concrete experiments. It implies that limitations on what is computable
ultimately are also limits of what we understand as ”scientific theory”,
and more generally to all the transmissible knowledge. We argue that it
is fruitful to look a epistemology from a computability perspective. We
show that it allows to precisely define different kinds of knowledge ac-
quisition techniques, and helps the study of how they are related to one
another.
1 Introduction
All of the transmissible human knowledge can be included into computer sci-
ence. Indeed, every book, every recorded teaching class or every picture can
be digitized and put inside a computer. One can even advocate that all of the
human literature is just made of different outputs of a single software: namely
a word processor to which one has provided the right inputs (the letters and
typesetting information to print down the book). This remark is more than a
cheap trick. It is in essence Go¨del’s technical point to prove the incompleteness
of the arithmetic. Indeed, the first step of the Go¨del’s proof is to encode math-
ematics within themselves. Propositions and proofs are encoded into numbers.
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The fact that some sentence is the proof of another sentence can then be viewed
as a peculiar relation between two numbers. The final step of Go¨del’s proof is
to encode a version of the liar’s paradox. It is done by formulating a proposition
stating something like: ”I am not provable”. The only way for the system to
hold is to have true sentences that are not provable. This result, that truth does
not necessarily implies provability, is paramount from an epistemological point
of view. Turing made a mechanical version of this theorem: the undecidability
of the halting problem. Turing exhibited a peculiar machine, the universal Tur-
ing Machine, that is able to simulate all Turing machines. This allows him to
build a self-referential paradox within this context: a machine that halts if and
only if it doesn’t halt.
The fact that all human knowledge can be seen as a part of computer science
shows that computability theory has a special status from an epistemological
point of view. Moreover, there are strong results on what is computable and
what is not computable. These limits do apply to all fields of the human wisdom,
not only computers. It turns out that looking at the epistemological landscape
from this point of view is fruitful and sheds new lights on the relations between
different categories of knowledge. In this context Turing machines are not seen
as mere computer but as an abstraction of an unequivocal computation, or
reasoning, that can be explicitly described.
You cannot explain everything
Whatever one may think of physical reality the only way to talk about it is in
a countable way. Indeed, every statement one can ever make about the world
are sentences written with letters drawn from a discrete alphabet. The same
argument can be said regarding measurements: at the end of the day one has to
record the measurements using words. The fact that the results of an experiment
is a video does not change that: the sentence associated with the video is just
the huge binary number composed by the bits of the file recording the video.
This is a casual version of Go¨del numbering technique. It is possible from there
to use the diagonal argument to show that the hope of a theory of everything is
not possible without having to unpack precisely what is intended behind words
such as explanation or phenomenon. What is only needed are the two following
basic requirements:
• An explanation is a sentence linked to a phenomenon of interest. It can
be instantiated. For instance the classical Newtonian mechanics gives an
explanation for the motion of objects. But for each system considered you
have a different instantiations of this explanation. Explaining why a shell
A will land on a particular location X is not the same explanation as why
shell B will land on location Y . Those are a two separate explanations
even if they originate from a single theory.
• An explanation is a phenomenon. Indeed, an explanation is a text that is
written trying to make sense of something. In itself it is a phenomenon,
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it has an expression in the real world (the piece of paper on which it is
written for instance, or the trace of the modification of a hard drive where
the text is recorded).
It would be very hard to understand what the term explanation means with-
out the first point. The second point is maybe more debatable but appears very
compelling: any discourse is a phenomenon of the world, and as such, one would
hardly not take them as phenomenon themselves.
Those two ingredients are enough for the self-referential paradox machine
to work. We can follow the path of Cantor, Go¨del and Turing to show that it
entails that, mathematically, it is not possible to have an explanation for every
phenomenon.
Since explanations are enumerable we can order them (using the alphabetical
order for instance). It means that there is a function Explain from integers to
sentences such that Explain(i) is the i-th explanation. Now, one may consider
questions like: ”are there any links between explanation i and explanation j?”.
Any explanation for such questions are phenomenon. But it entails that the size
of all phenomenon is at least equipotent to the power set of natural numbers.
For that, one has just to consider a sligthly different kind of questions: ”is
explanation i related to any explanation in the set S?”, where S is any subset of
natural numbers. A direct application of Cantor’s diagonal argument concludes
because the set of natural numbers is not equipotent to the set of parties of
natural numbers. Therefore, there are (infinitely many) phenomenon that can’t
have an explanation.
Negation and provability
Of particular interest is the role played by negation. One of the important result
outlined by the works of Go¨del and Turing is that negation does not commute
with provability. In other words ”knowing that no” is not equivalent of ”not
knowing”. The halting problem highlights this remark. When a machine is
trying to prove something and does not halt, one cannot say anything about
the result: it does not exist. It requires a computing machine to have this
idea of ”not having an answer”. Indeed, in mathematics partial functions are
completed by the addition of a bottom element. This bottom element is not in
the codomain of the function and denotes that the function is not defined on
particular points. But doing so is cheating because something is known that
shouldn’t. In a trivial way it is the difference between known unknowns and
unknown unknowns. On the other hand, if the result of the function is seen
as the result of a computation done by a machine, then the only way to have
a truly undefined answer is to not have an answer at all. Hence the crucial
importance of the halting problem.
This technical result, the fact that negation and provability do not commute,
has numerous repercussions in human knowledge. One example, is the judiciary
version of truth. By default the burden of proof is on the one who declares
not on the one who denies. A falsifiabilty definition of the scientific method,
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as proposed by Popper, is also an illustration of this point (see 3 for a more
elaborated discussion on this point). On the other hand, the precautionary
principle, is its opposite. Indeed, a central point of the precautionary principle
is that the doubt supersedes scientific knowledge. In all rigor, one may always
pretend that a danger will occur sometime: you can test the system x times
(days, years, generations, whatever), even if each test is a success one can always
pretend that problems will occur at the occurrence x + 1. There is no end to
this process that is ultimately semi-decidable: if there is a problem, one day
you will find out, otherwise you are going to search for potential problems ad
infinitum. But it is possible that this principle is of use when you deal with
very important issues involving important repercussions [TRD+14].
In this paper we advocate that epistemological categories can be defined
from a computability point of view. In the same way that some problems
are ”more” undecidable than others (see the arithmetical hierarchy [Rog87]).
The degree of confidence in the acquired knowledge goes from mathematical
certainty to fuzzier ideas. Linked to this is the problem of continuity between
ideas and reality. The basic problem is that knowledge should at least be a
safe approximation of the reality. The map should faithfully represents the
territory even if is necessarily an abstraction of it. Our aim is not to discard
non-scientific knowledge but rather to acknowledge that human knowledge is
inherently heterogeneous. Notably, there is this apparent paradox: there is a
scientific proof that not every part of human knowledge can be scientifically
established.
A tricky part is that some pieces of reality are subjective. Think pain, emo-
tions etc. It leads to a kind of Heisenberg uncertainty principle in humanities.
Indeed, by their very definitions the object of study is subjective. It leads to
overly context dependent truths. Adding to that a layer of complexity when
emergent properties of interacting subjects are considered, and one soon finds
that social sciences are by no way comparable to hard sciences. This last state-
ment can be shown as a technical result.
In some sense this essay, from a broad perspective, is an interpretation of
the Church-Turing thesis. Our take on it is that it is not that it is physically
impossible to have a machine more powerful than a computer, but that it is
impossible to build one. It points a limit of the formalization efforts based on
the language technology. The point being that one cannot build a machine if
one doesn’t have a set of instructions to do it. But the plan (which is in fact a
theoretical formal system describing your machine) cannot leads to something
more than a Turing machine. Indeed, as soon as an alphabet is used in order to
describe a piece of knowledge, it falls prey to computability limits. But there is
no reason altogether to think that this limit is a limit of nature itself. Besides,
even if no one knows how to build an artificial general intelligence, it is very
easy to produce one: one only needs to have kids. The point being that it is
not because one doesn’t know how something works that one can’t do it. But
it would be rather peculiar to present this as the result of an application of
structured knowledge.
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Outline of the paper
Different tiers of knowledge building strategies are going to be investigated. I
follow an approach based on computability theory. The idea is not to build
a formal morphism between the different levels of the arithmetical hierarchy
and the different way one can gather knowledge, ” la” Curry-Hoard [GTL89],
but rather to define a taxonomy of how knowledge can be built. There are
several tiers, for each tier there are different notions of proof, falsification and
certainty in the production of knowledge. The first tier of knowledge amounts to
decidable problems, and is basically represented by mathematics, it is discussed
in section 2. The second tier, tackled with in section 3 is the scientific approach:
knowledge belonging to this tier are such that there should be a workable way
to negate them, that is a constructive way to find counter-examples (which is
enumerability of disproof). The third tier is enumerability for proofs and is
studied in section 4: knowledge that are adressed in this section are such that
either one day they will be prooved, or they are not provable at all. In the
fourth tier, section 5, undecidable problems are tackled. It happens when nor
proof, nor proof or absence of proof can be achieved. Though one may still
builds knowledge on shakier grounds. Typically, functionnal knowledge that
emerge from repeated confrontations with reality. This kind of knowledge is
not scientific, but cannot be discarded at once. The only mechanism to uncover
this kind of knowledge is through survival: if a rule of thumb is old and has
worked reasonnably well for long period of time, one may have a certain level
on confidence about it. Then, in section 6, I adress another tier: descriptive
knowledge. It is the dual tier of the mathematical one. It is knowledge that
comes from reality and does not bring anything more than itself. It has the static
aspect of mathematics but is finite by nature. It is only interesting because of
its direct mapping to reality. For instance one may describe a country with a
map, but this map cannot be used to infer any new knowledge like theories and
model do. In section 7 is discussed a tier in which the objects of study itself are
subjective: humanities. Then, in section 8 deals with the particular bodies of
knowledge which are hard to sort because they cover wide areas. Due to scaling
difficulties they appear both as scientific at some scales and not scientific at
other scales. Typical example are economics and medicine. Finally, I conclude
in section 9.
2 The theoretical area: the world of abstrac-
tions
The mathematical world seems rigid at first sight: things are defined once for
all. The whole universe of the discourse is contained within the limits of a
small and precise set of definitions. Mathematical ideas have a very Platonic
flavor of eternal truths floating around us. In the same way that all legal chess
games are contained in the definition of the rules of the game. We can only
explore a limited area (play so many chess games) of mathematics due to the
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finiteness of our existence. But, in principle, truth remains eternal and outside
the reach of anything linked to reality: once the axioms and deduction rules
are properly defined, the only work left to do is to uncover truths that were
already implicit in the foundations. One can go even further and advocates that
those mathematical objects exist outside human existence. In this mathematical
ideal world, proofs are static objects obeying syntactical rules: one can make
a computer to check whether or not the proof is correct. For instance proof-
checkers like Isabelle [NWP02], Coq [Tea17] etc. are concrete examples of this.
Actually modern approaches of mathematical proofs are more complex than
that: game semantics [MPT09] or ludics [Gir01] are examples of interactive proof
frameworks for which there is not this idea of eternal truths. Proofs are seen as
Socratic dialogue between two players, one player trying to convince the other
of the truth of a statement. But even without considering those frameworks,
things are not as fixed as one may think:
• Firstly, one of the major work of mathematicians is not to find proofs,
but rather to define useful notions and structures. Mathematics is an
ever expanding domain where new useful abstractions are designed every
day. What does ”useful” means in this context? This question is very
deep and I will not tackle it more than by taking a functional point of
view. An abstraction is useful if it helps you to achieve a task in the
real world. A trivial example is given by the concept of numbers which
is arguably one of the oldest abstraction (with painting which is nothing
more than an elaboration on shadow, aka projection from a mathematical
perspective). The number abstraction allows to keep track of the herd for
instance. Addition, multiplication, equations and so on naturally derive
from the first abstraction and find other applications. Similarly, the basic
notions of geometry: points, lines, planes etc. are abstractions (pushed
to the limit) of shapes. The fact that those abstractions amount to the
same one, as brilliantly showed by Descartes in [Des37], can appear as
unreasonably surprising (to borrow from [Wig60]). But it is not relevant
from our epistemological perspective.
• Secondly, even if we stick to a static point of view that once the definitions
have been laid out, and one would only has to ”uncover” truths supposedly
existing from the definition, there is still work to do to produce the proofs.
This work is not free and has to be seen as a positive increase of knowledge.
Let us consider again an analogy on games: even if it is well-known that
in the game of Hex the starting side is theoretically winning (using a nice
argument of strategy-stealing by Nash see [Bec10]), it does not give a clue
on how to play an actual game.
The role of computability looks rather small in such an area in which ev-
erything seems to follow logically, one could even say mechanically, from the
definitions. Indeed, even if mathematicians have to work to produce a proof, it
would appear at first sight that this work could be done by a machine displaying
all the proofs in a way similar to the one that an infinite number of monkeys
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randomly hitting keys of a typewriter would end up writing all of Shakespeare’s
complete works. It turns out that things are more complex than that. Indeed
most theorems are not provable. This striking and famous result is due to Go¨del,
and known as the incompleteness theorem. There are several version of it: the
halting problem (writing a program that can decide whether or not a program
will eventually halt) may be seen as a particular instance. Therefore, the infi-
nite monkey remark does not apply. Indeed if it turns out that the theorem for
which you are looking the proof belong to the list of truths not provable. Thus,
a proof is nowhere to be found.
At the end of the day the certainty in knowledge acquired in the mathe-
matical area is built-in. Mathematical proofs, when they exist, stand on their
own: there are no experimental ways to falsify (or justify for that matter) a
mathematical result. The contact with reality only occurs via the concrete uses
of the mathematical theories. But, by themselves, those mathematical theories
are separated from real life. It is possible though to misapply mathematics, that
is to model a real life phenomenon and find contradictory results. In this case
the contradiction found is in the modeling process not about the mathematical
result in itself. This separation from reality comes with a cost: the one of con-
sistency. Ultimately, the only thing asked to a mathematical theory is to not
allow both A and not A to be true at the same time. This is the only guardrail
from erroneous judgments.
All in all the mathematical knowledge has a very platonic flavor in the sense
of the theory of forms: in the mathematical area truths look eternal, without
having to be located somewhere, etc. To paraphrase the quote from [Moo08]:
Mathematics are realityproof. This quote works somehow both ways. In math-
ematics you can go as far as your imagination will lead you with the only caveat
that you have to have consistency.
3 The scientific/rational area: Popper
There is a vast consensus on what constitutes the scientific method in order
to grasp a phenomenon.An hypothesis is defined, which amounts to a formal
system, based on your observations. Then, experiments trying to disprove the
hypothesis are elaborated and tested. It is more or less the philosophy of the
falsifiability proposed by Popper [Pop59]. The problem with this description is
that it does not ellaborate on what ”emitting an hypothesis”, and using this
hypothesis in order to make predictions, are. It hides the fact that compu-
tations have to be actually be made within the theory to compare the actual
measurements/experiments with what the theory forecasts. The very fact of
forecasting implies that the scientific method is subjected to the Church-Turing
thesis. Because at the end of the day one can only compute what is com-
putable... by definition. And if all what is computable is well captured by
Turing machines, then the scientific area cannot be beyond that. Hence the
scientific method can only be used for formal systems in which predictions are
computable. Computability limits do indicate hard limits of what the scientific
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method is subjected to.
If the existence of a limit for the scientific method is known, by definition
it cannot be defined precisely. Indeed, drawing that frontier would imply that
the halting problem would be solved by being able to tell which functions are
computable from which are not computable. The scientific quest is a never
ending one.
On one hand, one will always try to build more accurate theories of reality,
but on the other hand one may never know for sure when this quest becomes
illusory. A concrete example given by [CPGW15]. This work shows, that we can,
by design, build systems that, following our current formalism to understand
the world, behave in an uncomputable way. The idea is to build a structure
that has some physical properties if and only if some Turing machine halts. It
is conceivable, though, that a new theory can be designed in such a way that
this problem becomes computable. But first, in this new theory there will be
new uncomputable phenomenon (this is not without reminding the building of
the arithmetical hierarchy in which new unsolvable problems are built on top of
oracles solving previously unsolvable problems). And second, we can’t know for
sure that such a new theory is possible before having found it. It is very similar
to the task of finding decidable subclasses of an undecidable problem.
The falsifiability requirement of the scientific method means that science is
only considered established for phenomenon for which it is possible to provide a
constructive way to find counter-examples. By constructive it is meant that the
experiments should be practically implantable. Not in principle implantable,
but in real life with a constructive way to build the experiments.
From a computability point of view the scientific/rational claims can be
seen as the class of theories for phenomenon for which counter-examples search
is decidable. It means that there exists a way to decide, in a finite time, whether
or not there are counter-examples. It is not always like that. For instance one
way to prove the Goldbachs conjecture (every integer greater than 2 is the sum of
two prime numbers) would be to prove that there is no counter-example, which
can be shown equivalent to proving that the research of a counter-example for
this conjecture will never halts. Indeed, to find a counter-example one has to
try all even numbers one by one, but this search (that can be seen as particular
computer program) will never end if it turns out that the conjecture is true.
Certainty is achieved, in the scientific/rational area, within a global context:
a scientific proof implicitely supposes that Nature does not change the rule of
the game across time. More than that, it supposes that such a rule exists in
the first place. In fact, science can only reliably talk about phenomenon that
have this property. So the notion of proof is rather different in this area than in
mathematics: actually what is called a proof in the scientific area is an absence of
disproof with relation to a specific context. From a computability point of view
it is the class of phenomenon for which counter-examples search is decidable.
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4 The Semi-Scientific area: Science either for
the answer or the absence of scientific answer.
Refutability is a useful safeguard: it ties abstract theories with the real world
in a practical way. But there are pieces of knowledge that are not prone to
refutation while not being useless speculations. Those pieces of knowledge are
charactarized by an absence of positive evidence, but for which one never finds a
counter-example. The semi-scientific area is the dual of the faillability require-
ment in the following sense: f the claim is true, then a constructive proof will be
found, but if the claim is false, then we can prove that no proof that the claim
is false is possible.
Some issues inherently fall in this category. I may refer to them as ”semi-
scientific” knowledge (reminding semi-decidability). It means that for them
either, one day, a scientific answer can be settled, or it is possible to scientifically
assess that noone will ever have a scientific answer. It differs from the scientific
knowledge in the fact that there is no practical way to falsify them, but there is,
in principle, a way to validate them. It is an equivalent Goldbach’s conjecture
mentioned in section 3. No proof has been found that this conjecture is correct,
and no counter-example neither, which would be a falsification of this claim.
If this conjecture is true but not provable in ZFC this situation may continue
forever (assuming that the independance from ZFC axioms cannot be proved
too). Therefore a statement like ”Goldbach’s conjecture is true or we will never
find a proof that it is false” would be (assuming that it is not provable in ZFC)
correct and not refutable at the same time.
A typical example is the following statement: Is a phenomenon like con-
scioussness Turing-computable?
• If it is Turing-computable, hence someone may finally settle the question
by bringing out an algorithm that simulates consciousness, whatever is
understood by the term ”consciousness”. It is not difficult to imagine
that experiments could easily been set-up once a working definition of
”consciousness” has been layed out.
• If it is not Turing-computable, it means that it is not possible to describe
this phenomenon using a formalism. Indeed, if it were the case one would
be able to make a theory of concioussness, this theory could be written
down into a computer program which would contradict the fact that this
phenomenon is not Turing-computable.
It is a peculiar kind of knowledge: either it will become scientific (but without
any certainties until a working algorithm has been produced), or it is sure that
the answer, from a scientific point of view, can never be established.
Provability and Refutation
What is witnessed here is this absence of commutativity between provability
and negation. The scientific area of knowledge where there is decidability of
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counter-examples search. It means that if a counter-examples exists there are
decidable procedures to produce them. The semi-scientific area of knowledge has
semi-decidability of positive instances. It means that if the proposition is true,
one day a constructive proof will be found. But if the proposition is not true,
it is established that a scientific proof of that fact can never be established.
Relatively with the scientific area there is no decidability on how to produce
counter-examples in this area.
In this area though, there is the hope of a scientific proof. It makes this tier
of knowledge distinct from the tier examined in section 7 in which a scientific
cannot even be hoped for.
5 The Emergent area: Functional truths and
the test of time
Are the scientific, or the hope of a scientific, answer, the only ways to approach
knowledge acquisition? It turns out that the answer is no. There is another
technique based on evolution/selection, to expand knowledge: it is the knowl-
edge that works in real world and has passed the test of time while not having
a scientific explanation (ie a working theory in which the phenomenon can be
dealt with from an abstract point of view). The typical examples are myths and
religions. One way of seeing these functional truths is that they are collections
of stories that have been transmitted through generations: useful ones have
survived, unuseful ones have disappeared. Moral values, indications on what is,
and how have, a good life are example of such truths. They are typically ideas
that go backward from a causality point of view. Causality is the attempt to
describe the present as a function of the past. Moral values, political decisions,
etc., go the other way around: in some sense they are self-fulfilling prophecies.
It is because you want some future event to take place that you modify the
present by adpoting certain behaviors. In some sense it looks like that it is the
future that is the root cause for the present.
This tier of knowledge is very slippery because there is nor internal (coher-
ence), nor external (reality check in the form of properly defined experiences),
surveillance mechanisms working as a guardingrail. The worst part being that,
ultimately, it cannot even be proved that a particular kind of knowledge belong
to this tier (contrary to knowledge discussed in section 4). From a computability
point of view it is the equivalent of the Post’s theorem: if two complementary
sets are semi-decidable, then each set is in fact decidable.
In particular it means that one cannot hope to make a theory out of them.
And even if, at some point, an explanation is found, there is no warranty that
this is the ”right explanation”. A concrete example is given by the jewish food
law forbidding the simultaneous consumption of milk and meat. Nowadays
it is knowns that calcium makes the absorption of iron more difficult [Lo¨n10].
Moreover, due to the endemic presence of Malaria in this part of mediterrannea,
there were selective pressures leading to a higher prevalence of thalassemia than
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average. Indeed, thalassemia offers some kind of protection against Malaria
[Hal49]. But on the other hand people having thalassemia suffers from anemia
and have iron deficiencies. This theory is maybe a valid explanation of this old
jewish diet rule. But other explanations are also valid: maybe it was just a rule
to enforce ingroup/outgroup distinction, or maybe because a large part of this
population is lactose intolerant and it makes digestion easier for them. Maybe
it is a mix of those explanations or something else we don’t have any clue about.
The point is: we will never know for sure why this rule has been edicted and
preserved. Moreover, there is no hope to have a rational explanation meeting
the standard of a scientific proof one day. Because, at the end of the day, it is
a law that has been layed down by human beings, not a law of nature.
Functional truths are not subjective
Another point is that one cannot build those type of knowledge on his own.
Because by construction they are ideas that need to be tested over very long
period of times to prove their utility. Typically it takes many generations to
consider that an idea of this flavor is not just a subjective random idea. So even
if one profers such an idea, one will never know, or have a proof, of its efficiency.
Such knowledge actually are a product of the interactions between humans.
They are ideas vetted by adoption rate and adequation to the context in which
they are used. Other typical instances are human institutions: their validity
may change over time, they evolve slowly without one being able to precisely
pinpoints particular instant and circumstances at the origin of the evolutions.
The typical example is the one of natural languages.
Undecidability and relativity in practise
This area of knowledge is peculiar since it does not rely on consistency. It is
sometimes used as an argument in the discussion around religions vs atheism.
The point being that religions should not be relevant, because they contradict
each other. Let us reconsider the example of the jewish dietary rule regarding
meat and milk. It could be the case that it is simply for environmental reasons
that it is a useful rule. Therefore, there is no contradiction if in another region of
the earth, where then environmental context is not the same, that other dietary
rules are edicted more in accordance with local peculiarities. Actually, what
would appear as suspicious would be that religious beliefs were homegeneous
around the world, and across time.
On one hand, from a computability perspective, functional truths may cor-
respond to undecidable phenomenon. It looks like the Goldbach’s conjecture,
but from a practical/real point of view. One cannot find meaningful counter ex-
amples but yet cannot exhibit a theory of why such rule is correct. On the other
hand, from a historical/sociological point of view, functional truths appear as
context dependent laws that may only be valid in some specific contexts.
The fact that such kind of knowledge takes the form of religious revelation
is not surprising: since there are no real ”explanations”, they have to be taken
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for granted. This idea is well captured by the saying ”God works in mysterious
ways” which is not as sarcastic as one would may think at first, but as a re-
flection of undecidability/incompletness phenomenon in everyday life. Religious
beliefs could be seen as a method to render a partial function complete with the
addition of a bottom element: here the divine explanation fills the gap for all
unexplainable phenomenon.
Time as the only guardingrail
This land of knowledge brings the risk of misunderstandings, because of the
absence of guarding rails like consistency in mathematics or falsifiability with
the scientific method. Attempts to build theories (which ultimately may not
possible to either to prove or disprove such kind of knowledge) may spiral out
of control leading to religious wars since there are no established ways to vali-
date/invalidate this kind of knowledge. The only practical way lies in the test
of time which, admittedly, is a loose definition (how long is ”enough”?). It is
possible nowadays to somehow use the ease to widely spread information to see
if an idea is ”correct” more quickly. If the idea is largely used (and therefore
tested in a multitude of contexts). But one must always take into account that
time is required in order to cope with phenomenon having a very low probability
of happening while having a huge significance.
Another danger related to this kind of knowledge is to develop a relativistic
approach to the idea of truth. Which happens when one extends this category
to all landscape of human knowledge.
6 Descriptive area: raw knowledge
A large part of human knowledge is simply descriptive. The difference with
the scientific knowledge is that such knowledge does no come with a theoretical
framework. Thus, relatively to the scientific land, the descriptive land is the set
of collections of raw informations.
For instance he map of a stars at a given time does not create any knowlege
outside what is on the map or on the map itself. In this, it is very different from
the Newtonian theory of gravity which does provide new knowledge. Indeed,
given the relative positions of a satellite and forces that apply to it, one can
forecasts the future positions of the satellite. Another trivial example is that
you cannot use a map of London to find your path in Paris. But the science of
map drawing can help you to draw a map of anywhere you will find yourself.
From a computability point of view, this area looks like database manage-
ment more than computation of new knowledge based on data and a theoretical
model leading to the computation of new results. In some sense it can be seen
as a particular, finite, example of theoretical knowledge in which one has axioms
(recorded information) accompagned with a not very powerful query language,
meaning that inferences are very straightforward.
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Data Science and spurious correlations
A recent scientific trend, though, called data science, is trying to expand the
descriptive area through the use of statistical methods. It is also presented under
the designations Artificial Intelligence and/or Machine Learning. Initially the
role of statistics is to sort the wheat from the chaff and to eliminate the noise
in order to recover the signal from noisy measurements. It has been recently
overused as a supermodel of knowledge building strategy, with some going as
far as calling science dead. For instance C. Anderson states that the scientific
method is superseded by the deluge of data in [And08].
Of course there is the problem of spurrious correlations, eg see[aGL17]. But
beyond that critic, there is, underlying to these approaches based on data,
the assumption that behind every correlation there is a reason waiting to be
found. A reason is a theorical model allowing to describe the phenomenon
more economically than the phenomenon itslef. Moreover, it also presupposes
that all the variables that may have any influence whatsoever with this reason
have been recorded in a specific data collection. Those two points are highly
debattable. For once the existence of a reason cannot be presupposed. As have
been shown with Turing and Go¨dels work, it turns out that undecidability is
unavoidable as soon as you have a theory powerful enough. Therefore, most of
the phenomenon do not, given any theory, have a reason to begin with. Second,
even for phenomenon for which it is possible to build a theory, it is always a
possiblity that the peculiar set of data at disposal does not contain the right
data: either because of precision issues or hidden variables issues (ie one has
not precisely identify what are the relevant pohenomons). The risks liknked to
a purely statistical approach to knowledge has been well studied.
Fat Tail Events
There is another deep problem coming with the confusion between descriptive
and scientific knowledge. It is the problem of fat tail events. The idea has
been popularized by N.N. Taleb in [Tal07]. Basically it is the fact that for some
phenomenon, typically markets valuation, there are very rare occurrences of
very large events that dwarf the rest of the distribution. A basic example is
that in a single day of a market crash some banks may lose all of what they
ever earned. From an epistemological point of view the problem associated with
fat tail events is that it is not easy to separate the wheat from the chaff: a fat
tail distribution may mimic a thin tail distribution until a very rare, but very
catastrophic event, occurs. This is the problem of induction, well captured with
the Russell’s inductivist turkey allegory. Imagine a turkey that is fed every
day by, observationally benevolent, humans. Every day reinforces the belief
of the turkey that humans are good and will give it care and food ... until
Thanksgiving Day.
There is, though, an area where descriptive knowledge can be useful to
make predictions. For instance, if you look at height or weight distribution,
you have thin tail distributions. Such kind of distribution allows you to make
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basics previsions: typically you can the expected weight of x persons given the
population statistics and then build an appropriately calibrated elevator based
on this expectation (you know that seven persons will appoximately weight
550kgs). As mentioned earlier, it is typical of what a database-type query
returns. It is an information that is not strictly recorded, bu, basically, it is
possible to infer this information from first order logic: Codd’s theorem being
a famous example of this [Cod72].
7 Subjective area: Humanities and the fabric of
reality
From an epistemological point of view the problem of the humanities is that, in
this area, it is not even clear what ”reality” stands for. The typical examples are
psychological: self-consciousness, pain, feelings/sensations (like the sensation of
the blue of the sky, the odor of fresh bread etc.). On one hand it is very hard
to deny their existence, try to help a suffering person by telling him/her that
there is no such thing as pain for instance. On the other hand they have no
physical measurable direct instantiations: seeing brain activity of a personn
feeling pain is not seeing pain itself. This issue extends to inter-subjective
realities like languages or institutions that emerge from the interaction between
many people, but that are not natural phenomenon. Typically, the kind of
phenomenon described as catallactic [Hay78]. For instance the very idea of
being part of a nation has no biological, physical, or even purely subjective (you
may share this feeling with others but it cannot exists within a single person)
counterpart. It is therefore a field of knowledge about phenomenon that do not
exist outside our existence.
You know more than you can tell
Humanities is this body of knowledge that is not directly transmissible. For
example, to describe what reality is denoted by the word pain, one has to rely
on introspection and past events of his life. The meaning of pain is not commu-
nicated via words. One has to elaborate on shared experiences to communicate
about it. It marks a stark contrast with relation to mathematics, where the
meaning is carried by the text, and natural sciences, where the meaning re-
lies on measurable phenomenon. Note that measurements are nothing more
than standardised experiments. And, of course, the inert world doesn’t learn or
adapt, so experiments are reproducible. It is not necessarilly the case for living
entities, especially humans because they learn and adapt. There is a kind of
meta Heiseinberg principle at play: once a sociological or psychological study
has been done and published it affects what it was about in the first place. It
is even the standard procedure, one could even go as far as saying the aim, to
political action: first a study is requested, then, supposedly based on science,
politicians edict rules and regulations in order to act on the problem of interest.
Both the study, the conclusions, and the regulations may affect the society and
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make the so-called conclusions of the initial study no longer valid. A classic
(or should be classic) example is the famous marshmallow test [Car18]. More
importantly, it resulted in the replication crisis as we know it [Ioa05].
Therefore phenomenon belonging to humanities are, by definition, prone to
misunderstandings. Indeed, there are neither internal (coherence) nor external
(measurable reality) guards and thus no constraints on the discourse. There
is not even an equivalent of the global context in physics under which it is
presumed that phenomenon are stable across places, cultures and times. This is
partly why one can engineers hoaxes like Sokal’s hoax [SB99] and Sokal squared
[PLB18].
This absence of check and balance can be seen either for dynamic and static
production of knowledge in the realm of humanities. .
It is very hard in this area of knowledge to have models or theories that
meet the standards of the natural sciences. Indeed, phenomenon studied in
humanities are directly measured by, litteraly, what people say about it. It can
be indirectly measured by trying to tie a phenomenon to a manifestation (but
the two are in fact separate).
The problem in this area is that theories do not have solid links to an external
reality like in natural sciences. Therefore things can go south really quickly
because there are no clear ways to refute a theory.
8 Scale-variant area: Where art and science meet
together
There are body of knowledge where the object of study is a subtle mix between
subjective and objective. Two examples come to mind: medicine, for which the
debate on whether it is an art or a science continues today e.g. see [Pan06], and
economics. It turns out that such questions are linked to scale issues.
What does ”good health” even means?
A question as simple as: ”how do you define good health?” gets more and more
tricky as soon as one starts thinking seriously about it. A definition from the
dictionary [MKO03] is not very helpful:
a relative state in which one is able to function well physically, men-
tally, socially, and spiritually in order to express the full range of
ones unique potentialities within the environment in which one is
living.
Indeed the words ”well”, ”full range”, ”unique potentialities” could be dis-
cussed upon on many pages. For instance: does ”well” means good enough? or
better than the average (average for who? You nowadays? You across time?
The entire population? etc.)? And if someone is doing fine in three of the four
categories mentionned in this definition, but not fine (whatever that means) in
the fourth one. Does that mean that this person is ok or not? A maybe more
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practical way to define ”good health” is to see it negatively. Let us define ”good
health” as an absence of harm. Though it is only slightly more informational
since the word ”harm” is introduced without a proper definition.
This, not so trivial, question is of particular importance. Indeed, how can
be defined a field, here medicine, for which one doesn’t even know how to define
at what this field aims for? From an epistemological perspective it is even worse
than what was discussed in section 7, where the object of study is well defined,
even if it is subjective.
Note that the same kind of question raises the same kind of problems when
economics is considered: What is a ”good economy”? Does only the output
have to be measured? What about environmental issues? What about wealth
repartition? The list of questions raised by any definition is almost infinite.
Science at the micro-level, art at the macro-level?
Things get even stranger when both fields are considered at a micro-level. The
more small scale problems are considered, the more those fields behave, with
relation to knowledge, like scientific fields. In medicine the study of antibiotics
and their effects on various bacteria is as scientific as one can imagine. Now,
consider the epidemiological studies on whether or not to use antibiotics to treat
some cases, things get less clear. One has to take into account the effects of
the antibiotics (what is the effectivness of the molecule to cure the disease)
but one has to balance them with other factors: are there severe secondary
effect? is the disease treated by this antibiotics very dangerous (maybe the use
of antibiotics will only have a marginal impact)? On top of that you can add
epidemiological concerns: one may want to limit the use of antibiotics in order
to lessen the spread of resistant bugs. Economical considerations can also be
of interest: from the point of view of the society, is it worthy or not? Etc.
Consider the example of nutrition. The issue on how to properly feed oneself is
not a what can be called a new problem. Hippocrates put it this way let food
be your medicine some millennias ago. Today’s obesity and diabetes epidemics
show that little effective progress has been made in this area of health. On
the contrary vaccination campaignsi, for instance, are much more focused and
have led to sizeable successes. Studies after studies we have a moving definition
of what a healthy diet could be. This eluding ”good diet” theory is a perfect
allegory of the elusive definition of ”good health”.
In economics, some results are purely mathematical results: for instance Ri-
cardo’s famous example [Ric17] on comparative advantages is a textbook math-
ematical solution of an optimization problem. On one hand, one can discuss
about the applicability of this result in the real world, but one cannot discuss
the mathematical result on itself. On the other hand, when a very large-scope
point of view is considered, things get less and less scientific. The century old
controversy between Keynesian and Austrian economics shows that, whatever
your opinion on this particular debate is, there is nothing like a ”science is
settled” feeling in this field. It is mainly due to different perceptions on what
constitute a good economy.
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Statistics as philosopher’s stone
One way to circumvent the problems encountered by large scope issues for which
it is very hard to design useful theories, is to heavily use statistics. Though, as
the replication crisis [Ioa05] amply shows, it does not solve the issue at all. And
indeed, statistics are more suited to adress static knowledge than being used as
a general mechanism to infer medical or economical theories.
The use of statistics in natural sciences is of a different nature: for instance,
in Physics, statistical methods are used to estimate error intervals. Statistical
methods are here used not as a generic theoretical framework but as a way to
recover a signal by mitigating the noise emanating from real world imperfections
(of measurement instruments, error in calibration etc.). This is the legitimate
use of statistics.
The wider the scope of a medical phenomenon is, the more statistics are
used as a veil for the lack of control on what variables matter relatively to the
phenomenon of interest, and how actually causation works. The presupposition
is not only that the future will be like the past, but also that what has been
observed and measured is the only relevant part of the problem of interest.
It is bad practice both from both a theoretical and a practical point of view.
From a theoretical point of view because everyone knows that correlations are
not causations. It also not advisable because it promotes a lazy one catch all
attitude towards the scientific method: one relies on a single meta model which
is, in facts, pure statistics. From a practical point of view it can also be very bad:
fat tail events are poster child phenomenon demonstrating the ineffectiveness of
this approach in some situations. A typical example is the domain of finance:
assessing assets return based on an incorrect use of statistics arguably led to
market crashes that have impacted economy on a global scale [Tal07].
9 Conclusion
Computability theory plays a particular role in epistemology. Indeed, at its
very core, computability theory is a mathematical study of structured knowl-
edge. Ultimately, computability theroretical results have implications on many
branches of knowledge, specially for the scientific ones in which objectivity is
involved. Indeed, in order to have a useful theory one has to be able to actually
compute in this theory. Using this point of view is interesting since it sheds
a new light on different domains of knowledge acquisition techniques, and how
they relate to one another. Knowing the limits of structured knowledge is useful
and could be of help in many discussions. In the same way thermodynamics
played a decisive role in stoping researches for perpertual motion, we believe
that computability theory could play this role in other discussions.
A particular point for which computability theory can be interesting lies
in how unknowns are delt with. Contrary to standard approaches in which
it is implicitly supposed that a particular piece of knowledge is either known
or unknown (and in which double negation is understood as an affirmation),
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computability theory introduces these ideas around ”semi-decidability” that
are more subtle. Standard computability techniques, like the study of decidable
subclasses of undecidable problems, may prove useful in this respect.
Computability theory is a major intellectual feat of the XX0-th century. It
has not yet been largely used in discussions outside the scope of theoretical
computer science. Though we think it is important that it is taken into account
more often in other domains. In par with other great scientific ideas that help to
shape the intellectual discussion, from relativity theory to quantum mechanics
or genetics, computability theory notions may prove useful in many contexts.
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